Iran’s Law Enforcement Shuffle Reflects Concern About Protests

This analysis originally appeared in The Washington Institute For Near East Policy on January 5, 2022. The Supreme Leader and the IRGC are asserting more control over the task of monitoring and managing protest movements, creating yet another intelligence agency in the process. On December 8, Iran announced that it had restructured its national police force, a pillar of the regime’s internal security apparatus. Among other decisions, the organization’s name was changed from the Law Enforcement Force to the Law Enforcement Command (LEC). The addition of “Command” means that the…

Iranian Perceptions of the U.S. Soft Power Threat

To understand Iranian anxieties about Western cultural invasion, one need look no further than Psychological Operations Quarterly, a journal published until recently by the IRGC’s Social-Cultural Directorate. Focusing on the “soft war” waged by various Western entities, the periodical covers such material as supposedly anti-Iranian films (Alexander, The Wrestler, Argo), the relationship between McDonald’s franchises and the fall of the Soviet Union, and the harm done by English-language textbooks to the Iranian mind. Since 1979, in response to such perceived threats, the Islamic Republic has intensified enforcement of morality laws, purged professors from universities,…

Soleimani’s Shadow: The Fatemiyoun Division and Iranian Proxy Warfare Propoganda

Abstract Thousands of ethnic Afghan foreign fighters with the Iranian-backed Fatemiyoun Division and Zeynabiyoun Brigade have fought and died in Syria’s civil war over the last decade. Shia fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan have been critical not only to Iran’s successful quest to restore Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s regime, but as an asset for Tehran in its fight for regional primacy against Israel and other rivals. Fatemiyoun fighters will continue to serve on the frontlines of Iran’s proxy wars across the Middle East long into the future. This report…

Hezbollah is using propaganda to cover its deterrence deficit with Israel

This article originally appeared in the Atlantic Council’s MENASource on March 12, 2021. Tensions between Lebanese militant group Hezbollah and Israel have elevated since the July 20, 2020 Israeli airstrike on Damascus that killed the group’s fighter Ali Kamel Mohsen. Hezbollah should have avenged Mohsen by now and its continued failure to do so is creating a growing “deterrence deficit” vis-à-vis Israel. Hezbollah will likely use armed force to bridge this gap when more opportune conditions arise in Lebanon. Until then, the group is using propaganda to maintain the impression that its…